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| 3 4 | IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD INDIAN RESERVATION |
| 5 | BRIAN W. HITCHCOCK and ALBERT L.) Cause No. AP 94-284-CV HITCHCOCK,) |
| 6 | Plaintiffs and Appellants, |
| 7 8 | vs.) OPINION |
| 9 | SHAVER MANUFACTURING COMPANY and TRIPLE W EQUIPMENT, INC., |
| 10 | Defendants and Appellees. |
| 11 | Argued October 23, 1995 |
| 12 | Decided May 7, 1996 |
| 13 14 | Douglas Donald Harris, Esquire, Harris & Callaghan, P.O. Box 7937, Missoula, Montana 59807, for Brian W. Hitchcock and Albert L. Hitchcock, plaintiffs and appellants. |
| 15 | W. Carl Mendenhall, Esquire, Worden, Thane & Haines, P.O. Box, 4747, Missoula, |
| 16 | Montana 59806, for Triple W. Equipment, Inc., defendants and respondents. |
| 17 | Appeal from the Tribal Court of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, William J. Moran, Tribal Judge, Presiding. |
| 18 | Before: BROWN, GAUTHIER, AND WHEELIS, Associate Justices. |
| 19 | WHEELIS, Justice: |
| 20 | INTRODUCTION |
| 21 | Brian W. Hitchcock, and his father, Albert L. Hitchcock, who is a member of the |
| 22 | Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, filed their action in the Tribal Court of the |
| 23 | Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes on July 21, 1994. The complaint alleged that |
| 24 | Brian Hitchcock was injured when he operated a hydraulic post driver manufactured by |
| 25 | the defendant Shaver Manufacturing Company (Shaver) and sold in Missoula to the |
| 26 | Hitchcocks by Triple W. Equipment, Inc., a Montana corporation (Triple W). Albert |
| 27 | Hitchcock claimed damages for the emotional distress occasioned by his son's injury. |
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With Raymond and Leonard Hitchcock, Albert Hitchcock operates a ranch and farm near Arlee, on the Flathead Reservation. The Hitchcocks purchased a new Shaver Hydraulic Post Driver on April 17, 1991, from Triple W. The post driver was manufactured by Shaver in Iowa. According to the complaint, it was sold without a hand guard in front of the smash plate, and without a safety post holder. The price of the post driver was \$1,450.00; Triple W allowed \$200.00 for a mower traded in by the Hitchcocks, and Leonard Hitchcock paid the balance of \$1,250.00 with a check.

On August 1, 1992, Brian Hitchcock was working with his father driving posts on the Hitchcock land; his father was driving a tractor, and Brian, who was then twenty years old and who has a cognitive impairment, was operating the post driver. As Brian was holding a post to be driven, the smash plate struck his left hand, cutting off the long and the ring fingers and injuring his left index finger.

In their complaint, the Hitchcocks sought redress for Brian's injuries and Albert's emotional distress through claims based on negligence and products liability. Their complaint asserted that Shaver had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court by purposefully placing manufactured equipment into interstate commerce, including commerce within Montana and within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead Reservation. Similarly, the Hitchcocks asserted that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction of Triple W because it had purposefully sold equipment intended for use both in Montana and on the Reservation.

Both Triple W and Shaver filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that the Tribal Court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Triple W argued that its principal place of business was in Montana, but that it had sold the hydraulic post driver in Missoula without transacting for that business on the Reservation. It argued that because the sale of the equipment was completed off the Reservation, the sale was not a matter arising on the Reservation; it further argued that the Hitchcocks had not demonstrated that Triple W had engaged in the minimum

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contacts with the Reservation, which due process would require before personal or subject matter jurisdiction could be established. Shaver made similar arguments.

The Hitchcocks argued that Triple W purposefully advertises on the Reservation and in publications that are distributed on the Reservation, as well as actually selling equipment that is transported to and used on this Reservation. The Hitchcocks argue that discovery was not complete, and that further discovery would establish that Triple W actively pursues the sale of agricultural equipment throughout western Montana, including the Flathead Reservation.

On April 21, 1995, the Tribal Court issued separate rulings on the defendants' 10 motions to dismiss. The Tribal Court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction 11 over the claims stated in the complaint as to both defendants; it concluded, however, 12 that though it had personal jurisdiction over Shaver, it did not have personal 13 jurisdiction over Triple W. The Tribal Court distinguished a seller from a manufacturer, 14 reasoning that a manufacturer intends its products to be distributed as widely as 15 possible, but that the record did not show Triple W in this instance had taken any action 16 to sell the post driver for use on the Reservation. It noted that the record showed no 17 evidence of Triple W having had any contact with the Hitchcocks, except for selling 18 them the post driver at its store in Missoula. There was no allegation that Triple W had 19 entered the Reservation to solicit the sale or even deliver the equipment; nor was there 20 any allegation that Triple W had reached into the Reservation by mailing any 21 advertisement or brochure to the plaintiffs.

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The Hitchcocks appealed the order dismissing Triple W. Triple W moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the notice of appeal was premature. The basis of Triple W's motion was that the Tribal Court was obligated to follow Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which it argued would not have permitted the appeal because there were multiple parties in the action, one remaining before the Tribal Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed that motion on September 22, 1995, having concluded that although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are important guidelines for the Tribal Court, the Court was not obligated to follow the certification requirements of Rule 54(b) absent its enactment by the Tribal Council.

DISCUSSION

The basic due process requirements placed on tribal courts stem from tribal law

and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. Ordinance 36-B, codified as

Chapter II, Civil Actions, Section 1(2)(a) of the Law and Order Code of the

Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes states:

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To the fullest extent possible not inconsistent with federal law, the Tribes may exercise their civil regulatory and adjudicatory powers. To the fullest extent possible not inconsistent with federal law, the Tribal Court may exercise subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over all persons of the Tribal Court may extend to and include, but not by way of limitation, the following:

(1) All persons found within the Reservation.

(2) All persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court and involved directly or indirectly in:

(i) The transaction of any business within the Reservation:

(ii) The ownership, use or possession of any property or interest therein, situated within the Reservation;

(iii) The entering into of any type of contract within the Reservation or wherein any aspect of any contract is performed within the Reservation;

(iv) The injury or damage to property of the Tribes or a Tribal member.

We agree with the holding below that the Tribal Court has subject matter

jurisdiction in this cause. The complaint alleges an injury to a tribal member that

occurred on the Reservation because of defective equipment used on the Reservation.

This action falls squarely within Ordinance 36-B and is a matter arising on a reservation.

26 Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994).

Triple W argues that there are insufficient allegations in the complaint (or in what discovery is of record) to show it had the minimum contacts with the Reservation that

are necessary to support a finding of personal jurisdiction over Triple W by the Tribal Court. The Hitchcocks argue that the lack of evidence before the Tribal Court at the time of the Court's order was not their doing, and they request that the matter be remanded to Tribal Court for further discovery or an evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction. There is support for such a course—*see Harrington v. Holiday Rambler Corp.*, 165 Mont. 32, 525 P.2d 556 (1974)—and as a matter of general principle decisions on disputed personal jurisdiction should await a full development of the evidence on that point. In this case, however, it is not necessary to remand this cause for that purpose.

It is clear that this case involves issues that are distinct from what has become a
recurrent Indian law issue: whether a tribal court has jurisdiction over a non-Indian
defendant in a reservation-based cause of action, whether tort or contract. Increasingly,
federal courts have found no general impediment to that jurisdiction in federal law. In
each instance, tribal courts are required to determine whether in specific situations there
has been any diminishment of tribal court jurisdiction under federal statutes, treaties, or
in a tribe's own constitutional and statutory law. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe, 472 U.S. 845, 85 L.Ed.2d 818, 105 S.Ct. 2447 (1985); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
220, 3 L.Ed.2d, 251, 79 S.Ct. 269 (1959). See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324, 76 L.Ed.2d 611, 103 S.Ct. 2378 (1983); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136, 65 L.Ed.2d 665, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (1980); Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., Inc., 947
F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stock
West II); Wellman v. Chevron, 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).

Here, we are asked to decide whether an off-Reservation defendant, allegedly at fault in providing equipment without a necessary safety device and, consequently, responsible for an injury to a tribal member's son occurring within the Reservation, is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Tribal Court. It is of note that Triple W has not suggested that its off-Reservation location or its non-Indian identity automatically

shields it from Tribal Court civil jurisdiction. Instead, battle has been joined on the field of long-arm statute due process considerations.

The Tribal Court based its emphasis on a manufacturer's submission to jurisdiction in distant forums on a case arising in Montana and brought in federal court in that state in 1972. *Scanlan v. Norma Projektil Fabrik*, 345 F.Supp. 292 (D.Mont. 1972). The *Scanlon* Court held that due process was not denied when a Swedish corporation that manufactured ammunition intended for use by the general public was required to appear in Montana when the plaintiff was injured in Montana by defective ammunition purchased in an Idaho supermarket.

10 Generally, when sellers of defective equipment are found to be not subject to a 11 distant forum's jurisdiction, the distance from the forum to the seller's location is 12 usually great, and the courts have emphasized that the seller in these instances had 13 none of the "contacts, ties, or relations" with the forum state required by the seminal 14 decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Illustrative is World-15 Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1979), holding that an Oklahoma court 16 did not have jurisdiction over an Audi distributor in New York after the plaintiffs were 17 injured in Oklahoma in an accident en route from New York to Arizona. The Court 18 stressed the distributor's absence of activity in Oklahoma: there was no evidence that it 19 had services in Oklahoma, nor that it solicited business through sales or advertising 20 reasonably calculated to reach that state.

The language in *World-Wide Volkswagen* appears to blur any firm distinction
between a manufacturer and seller when examining a defendant's purposeful direction
of activities at residents of another forum:

...Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those

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States if its allegedly defective merchandise has been the source of injury to its owners or to others.... *World-Wide Volkswagen*, 444 U.S., at 297.

We do not believe that, in this case, any distinction between the manufacturer and the seller of machinery that causes injury in another jurisdiction is sufficient to vary the result on the question of personal jurisdiction over one as opposed to the other. The test applied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in determining whether the jurisdiction of one state extends to a non-resident defendant without denying due

process is the following:

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(1) The non-resident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.

(2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities.

(3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474 (9th Cir. 1986).

16 We adopt this test.

In the pertinent cases from the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme
Court, the focus in due process analysis is on the defendant's relationship to the forum
and the litigation. Part of the analysis is to ascertain whether the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.

The Flathead Reservation is at the heart of western Montana. Its boundaries
overlap those of four counties, Flathead, Lake, Mineral, and Missoula. There is a
common economic base in western Montana, largely in farming, ranching, timber, and
tourism. The people of western Montana, both Indian and non-Indian, whether living
on or off the Reservation, share that base. It is not plausible to argue that equipment and
materials sold within the land between the Rocky Mountains, Idaho, and Canada is not

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intended for the use of any person living there. The sale of agricultural equipment in
Missoula for Reservation use by a tribal member is sufficient to establish ties with the
Reservation, meeting all the requirements of *Hirsch* and of Ordinance 36-B.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Tribal Court dismissing Triple W
Equipment, Inc., for lack of personal jurisdiction.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 7th DAY OF MAY, 1996.

James Wheelis Associate Justice

Associate just

We concur:

16 Margery Brown 17 Associate Justice



Robert Gauthier Associate Justice

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Abigail Dupuis, Appellate Court Administrator, do hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the **OPINION** to the persons first named therein at the addresses shown below by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid at Pablo, Montana, or hand-delivered this 14th day of May, 1996.

Douglas Donald Harris Harris, Callaghan & Velk 218 E. Front, Suite 200 P.O. Box 7937 Missoula, Montana 59807

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Clerk of Court Tribal Court

and Dipor

Abigail Dupuis Appellate Court Administrator